ABSTRACT Location-based services (LBS) leveraged by ubiquitous mobile devices have brought great convenience to mobile users in various aspects, including communication, information exchange, social activities, and so on. However, privacy concerns arise at the same time, since the users need to submit their locations and query contents to the LBS servers. To this end, location privacy and query privacy have been recognized. In particular, this paper focuses on query privacy for preventing the leakage of users' query contents. Cloaking region-based techniques using untrusted servers and client-based k-anonymity approaches have been devised to preserve query privacy in LBS. However, these works suffer from single point of failure or insufficiency of query privacy. To address this issue, we investigate effective k-anonymitybased solutions for query privacy in LBS. We formulate a probabilistic framework PkA, under which k-anonymity-based mechanisms can be initiated, and analyze a recent proposed algorithm DLS as an instance of PkA. An algorithm circle segment is presented to provide effective query privacy when query interests have similar prior probability. To obtain more effective query privacy in general cases, we propose two algorithms MEE and MER, which optimize two individual privacy metrics, denoted expected entropy and expected max-min ratio, adopted in this paper. We recognize two practical properties-No More Leakage and k-Effectiveness for effective query privacy, and our proposed algorithms satisfy both of No More Leakage and k-Effectiveness. We conduct evaluation based on real-life data sets and synthetic distributions of query interests, and the evaluation results demonstrate that our proposed algorithms produce significantly improved query privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays ubiquitous mobile devices have brought significant comforts to mobile users in various aspects of people's daily life, including communication, information exchange, social activities, and etc [1] , [2] . Location-based services (LBS) is undoubtedly a vital application enabled by mobile devices, which are equipped with communication modules and sensing infrastructures. To enjoy the convenience provided by LBS, users submit queries attaching their locations and query interests, specifying where they are and what they want respectively. For example, Bob could query the LBS server for bars nearby by submitting his location and ''bar'' as the query interest. LBS servers process queries from users on their backend databases, and return query results to the users. LBS is attractive, since it does make our daily life easy and interesting, and it is usually free, such as Google Map, Find My Friends, etc. However, users in fact pay their cost in term of privacy although they are using economicfree LBS applications. When Bob queries the LBS server, the query discloses his location and what he likes (alcohol since he queries bar) to the LBS server and even vicious listeners to the LBS communication channels. The abuse or further leakage of Bob's location and hobby possibly incurs harms to Bob's private life and even violates personal safety in the worst case [3] . The privacy concern of location and query interests could get even more serious if it is correlated to the recent developed cyber-physical systems [4] . To this end, the research community recognizes location privacy and query privacy, which emphasize that the location and query interest of a user should be kept as sensitive information.
To protect query privacy for LBS users, many efforts have been made in the past years. A majority of these works through Cloaking are based on k-anonymity, i.e. hiding a user among another k-1 users. In more details, the Cloaking technique employs a trusted third-party server. A user u first sends a LBS query to the trusted server, which in the next step generates a cloaking region covering at least another k-1 users together with u, and then sends the cloaking region and query interests of concurrent queries (multiple users in the cloaking region could simultaneously submit queries) to the LBS server for response. Although the Cloaking technique tries to make u indistinguishable from the other k-1 users, it suffers from inherent drawbacks brought by the trusted server, which could be the bottleneck of performance and single point of failure of privacy protection. On the other hand, clientbased solutions are presented to avoid these drawbacks. [5] generates k-1 dummy query interests in continuous scenarios, and it chooses dummies with prior probability larger than a predefined threshold. Unfortunately, it is difficult to choose a proper threshold in real-life applications, and dummies are still distinguishable since their prior probability could be far from each other. [6] adopts an entropy based privacy metric, and it presents the Dummy-Location Selection (DLS) algorithm, which randomly selects k-1 dummy locations from 2k locations with prior probability around the user's location in the sorted order. [6] could be directly used for query privacy protection, but the DLS algorithm presented may still includes dummies distinguishable from the actual query interest, i.e. the prior probability of the k submitted locations or query interests are not close enough, or could be closer, thus degrading the privacy guarantee desired by k-anonymity. Therefore, effective protection of query privacy in k-anonymity manner is still on demand.
In this paper, we study on k-anonymity based solutions for preserving query privacy in location-based services. We introduce a probabilistic framework PkA under which k-anonymity based privacy preserving mechanisms could be initiated. References [5] and [6] and our proposed algorithms are instances of PkA. An entropy based metric and a differential privacy mannered metric are adopted to measure query privacy in this paper. We first recognize two vital properties No More Leakage and k-Effectiveness, and propose an algorithm Circle Segment satisfying the above properties to deal with query interests with similar prior probability effectively. Then we turn to the general cases in which query interests may differ significantly in prior probability, and present two algorithms MEE and MER to preserve query privacy in LBS for a given prior probability distribution of query interests. MEE and MER partition all the query interests into groups in which members have adjacent prior probability, and each k reported query interests are selected from the same group. In particular, MEE maximizes the entropy based privacy metric, while MER minimizes the differential privacy mannered privacy metric. MEE and MER invoke Circle Segment as a building block within each partition of query interests, and they utilize dynamic programming technique and have quadric computing time cost. In MEE, MER and [6] , the posterior probability of a query interest is proportional to its prior probability, and this property leads to the indistinguishability of query interests according to [7] . We conduct extensive evaluation based on real-life datasets and synthetic distributions of query interests. Evaluation results show that our proposed algorithms are able to obtain effective k-anonymity based query privacy.
The major contributions of this paper are summarized as follow.
• We introduce a probabilistic framework PkA for initiating k-anonymity based privacy preserving mechanisms. Some of existing works and our proposed algorithms belong to PkA.
• We present two algorithms MEE and MER, which generate reported queries based on partitioning of query interests. MEE and MER adopt dynamic programming to maximize the entropy based privacy metric and minimize the differential privacy mannered privacy metric respectively in the partitioning phase.
• We evaluate our proposed algorithms based on real-life datasets and synthetic distributions of query interests. Evaluation results show that our proposed algorithms achieve effective query privacy with regard to both the entropy based and the differential privacy mannered privacy metric. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce some preliminaries in section 2. Section 3 introduces the probabilistic framework PkA for k-anonymity based mechanisms. Section 4 proposes algorithm MEE and MER. Evaluation are presented in section 5, and related work is discussed in section 6. We conclude this paper in section 7.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section we first introduce the system workflow of the client-based k-anonymity approach, and present our adversary model. Then we introduce two privacy metrics adopted in this paper.
A. SYSTEM WORKFLOW
In a client-based k-anonymity approach, the reported query is generated from the client side. Here we denote the set of query interests by I , and for a LBS query q we denote the query interest by i q . Suppose a user u looks for bars close to his current location u.loc. To avoid the disclosure of u's query interest, i.e. bars, a query privacy protection component in u's mobile device first generates a query q r including u's query interest and another k-1 dummy interests, and then reports q r to the LBS server for response. This paper focuses on query privacy, so we use u's actual location in the reporting query q r (the report r for short in the rest of this paper, since the location is not considered here). Thus the report could be formulated as r = {i q , i 1 , . . . , i k−1 } (q r = {u.loc, r}), where i 1 , . . . , i k−1 ∈ I are k − 1 distinct elements from I and none of them equals to i q . After receiving q r , the LBS server processes k LBS queries, one for each query interest in q r , and then returns the results to u. Finally, u filters the results for the k − 1 dummy interests and gets the actual results for i q .
Here we list the notations used in the rest of this paper and their descriptions in Table 1 . 
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this paper we mainly take a malicious LBS server as the adversary, and the adversary is to infer the query interest in a LBS query (as introduced in [8] ). An adversary could see the following information: 1) the prior probability Pr(i) of each query interest i ∈ I , and it could be obtained by the solution in [6] ; 2) the reports from users, each including a location and k query interests; and 3) the query privacy mechanism adopted by users. When receiving a report r, the LBS server infers the probability Pr(i|r) that the user's query interest is i given the received report r. And the adversary could launch the following Bayes inference:
In the above inference, given a report r and an query interest i ∈ r the adversary could calculate Pr(r|i) since he is aware of the process of query privacy mechanism. Therefore the adversary could infer Pr(i|r) for each query interest i ∈ r.
C. PRIVACY METRIC
We adopt query privacy metrics of two categories to measure the degree of query privacy for a given mechanism M, that are expected entropy H E (M) and expected max-min ratio R MM E (M). Suppose for a query interest i, M produces a report r with probability Pr(r|i), and the prior probability of i is Pr(i). Denote the set of reports M produces by R(M), and then H E (M) can be calculated as follows:
Here H (r) is the entropy of a single report r. On the other hand, R MM E (M) can be calculated as follows:
The metric of expected max-min ratio in fact follows the idea of differential privacy, since it aims to make the outputs overall similar for inputs, which not to be distinguishable. Here the outputs are the posterior probability of query interests in a report, and the inputs are corresponding query interests.
Generally speaking, larger H E (M) and smaller R MM E (M) demonstrate better degree of query privacy produced by a mechanism M. Later in section IV, we present two algorithms to achieve the maximal H E (M) and the minimal R MM E (M) respectively.
III. THE PkA FRAMEWORK
This section first introduces PkA, a probabilistic framework of k-anonymity based query privacy preserving mechanisms. Next we present a naive solution for achieving the optimal mechanism under PkA for given prior distributions of query interests. Then a recently proposed k-anonymity approach DLS [6] is analyzed as an instance of PkA.
A. A PROBABILISTIC FRAMEWORK OF k-ANONYMITY MECHANISMS
Given the query interest set I and an integer k, we denote R k I = {r|r ⊆ I , |r| = k, ∀i, j ∈ r, i = j} as the set of all possible k-tuples of query interests to report. Let P R : I ×R k I → [0, 1] be the reporting probability function, which satisfies the following constraints:
• For ∀i ∈ I , r∈R k I P R (i, r) = 1. When a user u queries with interest i, the first constraint specifies that he can only report a k-tuple r which contains i. Otherwise u could not get meaningful answers from the LBS server. The second constraint guarantees that the sum of reporting probability for any query interest i equals to 1.
Our framework can be formulated as PkA(R k I , P R ). By specifying an instance for R k I and P R respectively, one can get a k-anonymity query privacy preserving mechanism. In more details, when querying i ∈ R k I , we can draw one sample from R k I (i) = {r|r ∈ R k I , i ∈ r}. The probability of drawing r is P R (i, r). The drawn sample will be reported to the LBS server for response.
B. ON ACHIEVING THE OPTIMAL k-ANONYMITY
In PkA, different instances of R k I and P R will lead to k-anonymity based mechanisms with dramatically different quality. Here we take the expected entropy as the privacy metric. As described in section 2.2, the adversary tries to infer the posterior probability of each query interest in the reported query r. According to the reporting probability function P R , Pr(i|r) could be inferred as follows:
Then we can get the entropy of r as
Then we can formulate the problem of achieving the optimal k-anonymity based mechanism as an optimization problem which computes P R for given I , k and the prior probability of query interests Pr :
Here P R is in fact a matrix each entry of which stands for a query interest i and a report r, and value of this entry is P R (i, r). The problem of achieving the Optimal PkA Instance (OPI in short) could be formulated as follows:
To avoid missing the optimal solution, R k I consists of all the k-tuples which contains k distinct query interests, so |R k I | = |I | k , and it could treated as an invariable. At meanwhile, we take Pr(i) as a constant for any i ∈ I , since the prior probability is an input. For a given r ∈ R k I , the values of H (r) and Pr(r) depend on the reporting probability function. The objective function computes the overall expected entropy for a specified reporting probability func-
The detailed formulation of the objective function is
Therefore OPI is a nonlinear optimization with |I | k variables and |I |+k |I | k constraints. For other privacy metrics, we could modify the objective function in the OPI . For instance when the expected max-min ratio is used, the objective function could be transformed as follows:
This objective seeks a mechanism producing reports consisting of indistinguishable query interests in an overall manner. The optimal mechanism measures the indistinguishability of a report r using the maximal ratio of posterior probability for any two query interests in r, and probability of reporting r is taken as the weight when the metric is adopted to a mechanism. To this end, the optimal mechanism achieves the best indistinguishability in an overall manner. Although the entropy version and the max-min ratio version of OPI do not lead to designs for efficient algorithms, OPI does depict the search space for feasible k-anonymity based mechanisms. In fact, both existing works and this paper pick feasible solutions under OPI as query privacy preserving mechanisms.
C. ANALYSIS OF DUMMY -LOCATION SELECTION
Here we briefly demonstrate that the DLS algorithm proposed in [6] belongs to the framework of PkA. When a user u queries an interest i, DLS first takes k query interests right before and right after i according to the order of prior probability as candidates, and the number of candidates is 2k. Then DLS randomly selects m sets of k − 1 dummies from the 2k candidates, and builds m dummy queries, among which the one with largest entropy is reported to the LBS server. The PkA components R k I and P R for DLS could be instantiated as follow. For a given I and prior probability Pr : I → [0, 1], denote the order of query interest i in I according to prior probability by o(i). Here the order could be ascending or descending. Then R k I = {r|∀i, j ∈ r, |o(i)−o(j)| ≤ 2k +1}, and for ∀i ∈ I , ∀r ∈ R k I and i ∈ r the reporting probability
k . In the initiation of P R (i, r), o i (r) denotes the descending order of r in {t|t ∈ R k I , i ∈ t} sorted by normalized entropy calculated as
P R (i, r) is the probability that r has the maximum normalized entropy among the m generated reports. DLS pioneers the design of client based k-anonymity approaches, however, it has some drawbacks. First, the privacy metric DLS presents is not accurate but an approximation. That is, the normalized entropy should be calculated as
instead of that in equation 4, and the according to P R (i, r) for DLS equation 4 and 5 will return different results. Second, but more importantly, one can eliminate dummy interests in DLS's reports with high probability. Since DLS randomly picks k − 1 dummies from 2k candidates, in the report r we
Due to the process of DLS algorithm, if a user u queries i, j will not appear in the candidate sets, thus DLS will not reports r for i, neither for j for the same reason. This means the adversary is sure that u is not querying i or j. After eliminating ineffective dummies such as i and j, DLS fails to provide the desired k-anonymity. What's more, the probability that dummies could be eliminated is given as follows:
In Pr DLS Elim , 2k k−1 is the total number of ways to select k − 1 dummies from 2k candidates, and there are only 2k selections which do not lead to ineffective dummies. When k grows to 5, Pr DLS Elim = 20/21 ≈ 95.2%. In our evaluation, we also adopt the normalized entropy calculation in equation 4 while evaluating the DLS algorithm, since it is very costful if using equation 5. However, we should be noted that equation 4 is not accurate. At the same time, we will eliminate ineffective dummies from DLS reports before the calculation of normalized entropy, and this will make DLS reports contain fewer than k query interests.
IV. k-ANONYMITY ALGORITHMS
This section presents algorithms for establishing query privacy preserving mechanisms. We start from an algorithm CircleSegment which establishes a building block of the other two algorithm MEE and MER. Then MEE and MER are proposed to achieve the maximal expected entropy and the minimal expected max-min ratio respectively.
A. CIRCLE SEGMENT ALGORITHM
Here we present algorithm CircleSegment, which initiates a k-anonymity based mechanism under PkA. Before introducing CircleSegment, we emphasize two vital properties a query privacy mechanism should provide, namely No More Leakage and k-Effectiveness. Given I , k and the prior probability Pr : I → [0, 1], the definition of No More Leakage and k-Effectiveness are given as below.
Definition 1: No More Leakage A k-anonymity based query privacy mechanism M provides the property of No More Leakage if for ∀r ∈ R(M), ∀i, j ∈ r and Pr(i) ≥ Pr(j), the following condition holds:
The property of No More Leakage guarantees that query interests i and j will not get more distinguishable, compared to that of prior probability, after the adversary receives the report r. Thus it is easy to see that the ratio of posterior probability of i and j should be bounded by
Pr (j) . At the same time, a mechanism should not aggressively degrades The property of k-Effectiveness is to insure that an adversary could not eliminate any query interest i from a received report r, and this is achieved by making the posterior probability Pr(i|r) > 0. Otherwise, the desired k-anonymity is not obtained. As analyzed in section 3.3, the DLS algorithm fails to provide k-Effectiveness.
The procedure of CircleSegment is shown in algorithm 1. CircleSegment organizes I into a circle ordered by prior probability, and reports k adjacent query interests at a time. In more details, CircleSegment first initiates an empty report r in line 1, and sorts I according to prior probability in line 2. It randomly selects a number pos from 1 to k as the position of i in r(line 3). Then CircleSegment puts k adjacent query interests, among which the order of i is pos, into r in a tail to head manner(line 4-11). I [start] is the first element put into r. When cusor gets to the tail of I , it move back to I 's head(line 10-11).
For each i ∈ I , there are k possible reports containing i, and CircleSegment reports each of them with probability The time complexity of CircleSegment is O(|I | log |I |), which is dominated by the sorting process of I . CircleSegment is proper to deal with query interests with similar prior probabilities, and in the following proposed algorithms we use CircleSegment as a building block to deal with a smaller number of adjacent query interests instead of the entire I .
B. MAXIMAL ENTROPY ALGORITHM
When query interests in I have quite different prior probabilities, CircleSegment is not able to achieve sufficient query privacy, as illustrated by the privacy metric of expected entropy and expected max-min ratio. We propose algorithm MaximalExpectedEntropy (MEE in short) to address this problem. The major idea is to sort I according to prior probability, and partition the sorted sequence of query interests into non-overlapping segments. Query interests in the same segment have more similar prior probabilities, and MEE adopts CircleSegment on each segment to build a partial mechanism. Finally, MEE combines all the mechanisms on each segment as an overall mechanism. In this process, MEE maximizes the expected entropy of the produced mechanism through carefully designing of partitioning strategy.
Denote the sorted sequence of query interests by  I [1] 
MEE computes a partitioning strategy, which maximizes the expected entropy as calculated in equation (7) 
where 
return S;
The above structure obtains the optimal solution for MEE [i] with certain MEE[j] (j < i) and segment seg i j+1 , or seg i 0 . This process traverses all possible j for i, thus it will not miss the optimal solution. The following theorem conforms the correctness of MEE's dynamic programming structure. We omit the proof for space.
Theorem 4: The dynamic programming adopted by MaximalExpectedEntropy leads to the maximal expected entropy among all possible partitioning strategies.
The partitioning strategy of MEE is given in algorithm 2. It first sorts I in the order of prior probability(line 1), and then computes the optimal partitioning strategy under different cases(line 2-10). The parameter e specifies the subsequence processed, that is, MEE returns an optimal partition for {I [1] , . . . , I [e]}. The optimal partition could be obtained by setting e = |I |. The time complexity of MEE is O(|I | 2 ), since it runs in |I | iterations, and each iteration needs at most O(|I |) computation cost. The cost of sorting I is dominated by O(|I | 2 ).
Algorithm 3 computes a report r for a query interest i. It includes the process of computing the optimal partitioning, which is not actually necessary for every LBS query. In fact, the optimal partitioning could be computed as system initiation, and then gets invoked for later queries. After eliminating the cost for the optimal partitioning, the time complexity of MEEMechanism is O(|I | log |I |), since it includes (1) looking for i in S with O(log |I | k ) time and (2) invoke CircleSegment with O(|I | log |I |) time.
C. MINIMAL EXPECTED MAX-MIN RATIO ALGORITHM
We adopt similar idea of MEE and propose a dynamic programming based algorithm MinimalExpectedmmRatio (MER in short) to obtain the minimal expected max-min ratio. MER first sorts I according to the prior probability, and partitions the sorted sequence into segments. On each segment, MER runs CircleSegment to build a partial mechanism, and it combines all the partial mechanisms as the overall mechanism. MER differs from MEE with respect of privacy metric computation and dynamic programming structure.
Suppose the sorted I is partitioned into S = {s 1 , . . . , s m }. Let R MM E (s) be the partial expected max-min ratio on segment s, and denote R(s) the set of reports produced by querying any i ∈ s (we omit the notion of mechanism M here), then R MM E (s) is calculated as
Pr(i)Pr(r|i) Pr(j)Pr(r|j) i∈r Pr(i)Pr(r|i)).
Based on the notion of R MM E (s), we can compute the expected max-min ratio using the following equation:
MER computes a partitioning strategy with the minimal expected max-min ratio using dynamic programming. Denote MER [x] as the minimal expected max-min ratio by partitioning subsequence {I [1], . . . , I [x]}, and MER[|I |] is the overall minimal max-min ratio on I . The structure of dynamic programming is
When computing MER[i]
for i ≥ 2k, the above structure seeks splitting points for subsequence seg i 0 , which leads to the minimal expected max-min ratio. The following theorem illustrates the correctness of the dynamic programming structure of MER.
Theorem 5: The dynamic programming adopted by MER leads to the minimal max-min ratio among all possible partitioning strategies.
Algorithm 4 shows the process of obtaining the optimal partitioning with the minimal max-min ratio. It first sorts I and computes the optimal partitioning for different values of e. For the entire I , we could invoke MinimalExpectedmmRatio(I , k, Pr, |I |) to get the optimal partitioning. The time complexity of MER is O(|I | 2 ), since 
return S; it runs in O(|I |) iterations, and each iteration costs at most O(|I |) time to combine S.
The process of obtaining a mechanism based on MER is similar with that of MEE, so we omit it for space. The time complexity of reporting a LBS query based on MER is also O(|I | log |I |).
In the end of this section, we present the following theorem to illustrate the two vital properties of our proposed algorithm.
Theorem 6: The mechanisms for MEE and MER both provide the properties of No More Leakage and k-Effectiveness.
What's more, if future works design mechanisms satisfying No More Leakage and k-Effectiveness properties with better performance and effectiveness compared to that of CircleSegment, our proposed algorithms could be easily updated with the newly designed algorithms as a building block by replacing CircleSegment.
V. EVALUATION
This section evaluates the performance of our proposed algorithms MEE and MER based on real-life datasets and synthetic query interest distributions.
A. EVALUATION SETUP
We employ three real-life datasets, including TX , CA and POIs, to obtain probability distributions of query interests for our evaluation. TX and CA are obtained from the OpenStreetProject [9] , and they include street information in the state of Texas and California. Each entry in TX and CA contains latitude, longitude and a set of keywords. The POIs dataset from [10] include world wide coordinates and geotags. We adopt keywords and geo-tags in the above datasets as query interests in our evaluation. The prior probability distributions of query interests are computed as follow. Each dataset is divided into 8km × 8km regions, and we calculate a probability distribution of query interests in each region. Given the size of I and a region R, I contains query interests with |I |-largest frequency in R. And the prior probability is calculate with in each region independently. In the preprocessing of TX and CA, we remove entries only with keywords for city names and state names, since they dominate top frequency with few cardinality but provide no meaningful information. Details of datasets in our evaluation are listed in table 2. To further evaluate our proposed algorithms over different query interest distributions, we generate synthetic prior probability distributions of query interests following zipf law with exponent parameter sf as 0.01, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1.0. The synthetic distributions cover from uniform distribution to highly skewed distributions.
For each real-life dataset we evaluate our proposed algorithms based on three privacy metrics including expected entropy, expected max-min ratio and effective k. Here effective k is a third privacy metric adopted in addition to expected entropy and expected max-min ratio introduced in section 2.3. Effective k measures the number query interests with nonzero posterior probability in a report to the LBS server. An effective query privacy mechanism should provide effective k which equals to the number of query interests in a report. For each privacy metric, the effects of two parameters k and N are evaluated. Here k is the number of query interests reported to the LBS server, and N is the total number of query interests. In our evaluation, k is set to be 3, 5, 10, 15 and 25, and its default value is 10. At meanwhile, N is set to be 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100, and its default value is 60. For the evaluation based on different synthetic distributions of query interests, we set k and N as 10 and 60 respectively, and test the effects of skew factor including 0.01, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1.0. Our proposed algorithms together with the DLS algorithm to be compared with from [6] are implemented in Java with JDK1.8. The evaluation is run on a PC machine with i5-2400 CPU, 8GB memory and a 500GB 7200 rpm disk. For the reallife datasets, we present the average values of privacy metrics from each divided regions. For each synthetic distribution, we report the original privacy metric values since only one region is obtained for each query interest distribution.
B. EVALUATION RESULTS
To have a better insight of the query interest prior distributions obtained from each real-life datasets, we show the average cumulative distribution of CA, TX and POIs in Fig.1 . While calculating the cumulative distribution, we sort the prior probability in ascending order and only the 100 most frequent query interests are considered. Fig.1 shows that CA is the most skewed dataset while the POIs is the most uniform one in term of query interest prior distribution. Next we present our evaluation results for the adopted privacy metrics including expected entropy, expected max-min ratio and effective k.
In Fig.2 and Fig.3 we measure the expected entropy for CA, TX and POIs with different values of parameter k and N . To test the effects of k on expected entropy, we fix N at 60 and vary k from 3 to 25. As shown in Fig.2 , our proposed algorithm MEE and MER achieves significantly better expected entropy compared to the DLS algorithm. The major reason is two-fold. First, MEE and MER adopts partitioning strategy to achieve better expected entropy. Second, MEE and MER provide the property of k-Effectiveness, and the adversary can not eliminate any query interests from a received report. At meanwhile, the expected entropy for MEE, MER and DLS grows with parameter k. It is interesting to see that MEE and MER produce quite similar expected entropy. This is because reducing the max-min ratio at the same time improves the expected entropy. In fact, MEE obtains slightly better expected entropy. Fig.3 shows the relationship between the expected entropy and parameter N . We fix k at 10 and vary N from 50 to 100. As shown in Fig.3 , our proposed algorithms MEE and MER again achieves significantly improved expected entropy compared to the DLS algorithm. When N grows from 50 to 100, the expected entropy for MEE and MER produce slightly improvement, since a larger number of query interests brings a larger search space for achieving better expected entropy and expected max-min ratio. Similar with that shown in Fig.2 , MEE outperforms MER slightly in term of expected entropy. At the same time, the expected entropy of DLS decreases when N grows. The reason is that a larger N brings more skewed prior distribution of query interests, and DLS simply picks dummies around the actual queried interest thus it degrades the expected entropy. On contrary, MEE and MER could avoid packing query interests with quite different prior probabilities into the same report by carefully designed partitioning strategies. Fig.5 depict the second privacy metric, expected max-min ratio, achieved by MEE and MER compared to DLS. As shown in Fig.4 , the expected max-min ratio grows with parameter k, and MEE and MER produce slightly larger expected max-min ratio compared to DLS. As k increases, more query interests are packed into the same report, so it obviously increases the expected max-min ratio. DLS fails to achieve the property of k-Effectiveness, and in our evaluation we eliminate query interests, whose posterior probability equals to 0. In fact, the number of effective query interests in a report produced by DLS is smaller than k, thus DLS produces smaller expected max-min ratio. The expected max-min ratio for CA dataset is much larger than those of TX and POIs datasets, because the prior distribution of query interests in CA is more skewed.
As shown in Fig.5 , when N grows from 50 to 100, the expected max-min ratio of MEE, MER and DLS decrease, and DLS again produces smaller expected max-min ratio. This is because the tail of prior distribution for query interests in CA, TX and POIs are more balanced, so including more query interests at the same time make query interests packed into the same report more balanced. From both Fig.4 and Fig.5 we can see MEE and MER achieve quite similar expected max-min ratio, and MER outperforms MEE slightly. MEE and MER achieve better expected entropy and proper expected max-min ratio respectively, and the above results show the effectiveness of our proposed algorithms. Fig.6 and Fig.7 present effective k obtained by MEE, MER and DLS with varied parameter k and N . As shown in Fig.6 , MEE and MER achieve effective k which equal to parameter k, since both MEE and MER provide the property of k-Effectiveness. At the same time, DLS does not provide the property of k-Effectiveness so it produces smaller effective k, however the effective k value for DLS also grows with parameter k.
In Fig.7 we fix parameter k at 10 and vary parameter N from 50 to 100 and test the effective k for MEE, MER and DLS. From the results we see that MEE and MER achieve effective k with the same value of parameter k, and the effective k produced by DLS reduces slightly when parameter N grows. This is due to the process of DLS. Querying an interest near the smallest and the largest prior probability could provide better effective k, and increasing parameter N reduces the above cases thus it make DLS produce smaller effective k.
To further understand the effects of skewness of the query interest prior distribution on our adopted privacy metrics, we evaluate our proposed algorithms over synthetic zipf distributed probability for query interests. Here we fix parameter k at 10 and parameter N is set to 60. Fig.8 (a) measures expected entropy for our proposed algorithms. MEE and MER achieve almost the same expected entropy and they both outperform DLS significantly. As the skew factor grows from 0.01 to 1.0, the expected entropy obtained by MEE, MER and DLS decrease respectively, since more skewed query interests are packed into reports. As shown in Fig.8(b) , MEE and MER produce larger expected max-min ratio than that of DLS, and the difference becomes larger as the skew factor grows. This is because DLS include fewer than k effective query interests as MEE and MER, so smaller expected max-min ratio is obtained. At the same time, the difference becomes larger since the prior distribution of query interests follow zipf distribution. We can also see when the prior distribution becomes more skewed, the expected max-min ratio for MEE, MER and DLS all grows. In Fig.8(c) we show the effective k achieved by MEE, MER and DLS. As shown, MEE and MER achieve the value of k, while DLS produces much smaller effective k. Again this illustrates that our proposed algorithms provide the property of k-Effectiveness which is absent from DLS.
VI. RELATED WORK
A large body of existing work for protecting privacy in LBS is based on the concept of k-anonymity, which is introduced by database community [11] . A majority of these works use cloaking technique, and employ trusted servers for achieving k-anonymity through the technique of spatial generalization. A cloaking technique based solution hides a user among another k −1 users within a generalized area, so the adversary, i.e. the LBS server, is not able to infer which user submits a query. Such approach is conducted to protect both location privacy and query privacy. Works such as [12] - [28] fall into this category. On the other hand, peer-to-peer technique has been leveraged to obtain self organized cloaking region by [29] and [30] . Reference [31] proposes a mechanism for location privacy in the application of review publication, which is partially related to location-based services. Reference [6] designs algorithms for generating proper dummies for locations in the reported queries to prevent the LBS server from recognizing the user's actual locations. In [6] , 2k locations having similar probability with the user's location are chosen as dummy candidates, and k-1 of them are randomly selected as final dummies. This approach aims to obtains good entropy by reporting dummies with similar prior probability with the queried location. Although this solution includes random nature, the posterior probability of the k reported location are still different due to the process of dummy selection, and furthermore, an adversary is usually able to eliminate ineffective dummies, whose posterior probability equal to 0, from the report. Reference [32] follows [6] and employs cache to avoid submitting queries to LBS server as much as possible, and thus it prevents the leakage of user's location. Reference [5] proposes a mechanism for protecting query privacy in a continuous manner. Reference [5] generates a set of k query interests for a traveling path, and the user reports the same query interests along the path to avoid privacy breach. This paradigm fits to continuous querying, however there is no privacy guarantee since it simply chooses query interests with probability larger than a predefined threshold as candidates. In summary, server-based k-anonymity solutions such as cloaking suffer single point of failure for privacy, and existing client-based solutions do not provide effective privacy guarantee based on the k locations or query interests reported to LBS server. Entropy based privacy metric has been widely adopted by existing works including [33] - [35] . This paper employs the expected entropy and the max-min ratio as privacy metrics for query privacy in LBS applications, and we present algorithms satisfying two vital properties while optimizing the above privacy metrics.
Horizontal to entropy, differential privacy [36] has been widely accepted as a standard notion of privacy in various fields. Differential privacy is first introduced in statistic databases [36] . The underlying idea of differential privacy is that a minor change of input should not modify the output significantly. By this guarantee the adversary can not recognize the input among all possible inputs similar to the actual one. Due to the simple and clean nature of differential privacy, it has been adopted widely, such as machine learning [37] , statistic database [38] , data mining [39] , graph [40] , crowdsourcing [41] and so on. In addition to differential privacy, a number of existing works adopt customized privacy metrics to balance privacy and privacy, such as [42] and [43] in social network data. In the literature of privacy preservation in LBS, geo-indistinguishability [7] is presented to ensure that an adversary will not obtain much improved information about a user's location after he receives the reported query. This is achieved by making the ratio of two nearby locations' posterior probability similar to that of their prior probability. Our work achieves minimal max-min ratio which is in fact towards the same direction of anonymity with differential privacy [36] and geo-indistinguishability [7] . At the same time, our approaches satisfy the property of No More Leakage, and it provides query privacy equivalent to that of 0-geo-indistinguishability. Thus this paper provide effective k-anonymity for query privacy in location-based services.
Other contribution related to privacy issues in LBS includes privacy preservation for mobile social network data [44] , mobile crowdsourcing applications [45] and etc.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we formulate a probabilistic framework PkA for initiating k-anonymity based privacy preserving mechanisms in location-based services, and we demonstrate recent proposed methods and our proposed algorithms are under PkA. We recognize two practical properties No More Leakage and k-Effectiveness, then we present an algorithm CircleSegment satisfying our recognized properties. For two individual privacy metric, expected entropy and expected max-min ratio, adopted in this paper we propose two algorithms MEE and MER. MEE and MER utilize dynamic programming technique to achieve the maximal expected entropy and the minimal max-min ratio respectively by devising sophisticated partitioning strategies for query interests. Both of MEE and MER employ CircleSegment as a building block, and have quadric computational cost in term of the number of query interests involved. We evaluate our proposed algorithms over three real-life datasets and a number of synthetic distributions of query interests. The evaluation results illustrate that a significant privacy improvement is obtained by our proposed algorithms against a recent proposed competitor. 
